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COMMENTS
THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
UNCONSCIONABILITY TO WARRANTIES:
A MOVE TOWARD STRICT LIABILITY
WITHIN THE U.C.C.
I. INTRODUCTION
The sales warranty has long played a major role in the field of product
liability, chiefly because the concept of warranty has always possessed a unique
flexibility permitting development in accordance with the prevailing social
policy, whether the impetus of that policy was toward protection of the manu-
facturer or protection of the consumer. The application of the unconscion-
ability doctrine to warranty disclaimers presents a new method by which the
sales warranties presently arising under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), may be expanded to provide more effective consumer protection.
This new development, however, while potentially significant, comes at a time
when the position of the traditional warranty concept is being challenged by a
new concept-a system of strict liability based upon tort-that may ultimately
displace, at least partially, the Code warranties in the product liability field.
Long one of the traditional bases of product liability, warranty occupies a
unique position in the law primarily due to the difficulty attendant in its
theoretical classification-a difficulty that has arisen because the courts have
wavered in their application of contract and tort theories to warranty. The
conflict within the Uniform Commercial Code between contract and tort
theories is an outgrowth of the manner in which warranty has developed.
Breach of warranty was originally regarded as a pure tort action for deceit,
properly initiated under a writ of trespass on the case, and was held to be
entirely distinct from the contracts field.' This classification remained un-
challenged until 1778, when Stuart v. Wilkens held that assumpsit was the
proper form for an action based upon the breach of a vendor's express war-
ranty.2 The eventual result of this decision was that warranty came to be
regarded as contractual in nature.3 The new character of the action gave rise
to a question: If warranty was contractual, was it exclusively so, or did it
still contain elements of tort? The courts have provided no easy solution.
While some have held that a breach of warranty will, in and of itself, admit
of either a contract action or a tort action, 4 others have held that a contract
1. W. Prosser, Torts § 95, at 651 (3d ed. 1964); Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1888); Note, Necessity for Privity of Contract in Warranties by Rep-
resentation, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 414 (1929).
2. Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Dougl. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778).
3. Mahurin v. Harding, 28 N.H. 128, 130, 59 Am. Dec. 401, 403 (1853); Wels v.
Oldsmobile Co., 147 Ore. 687, 691, 35 P.2d 232, 233 (1934); W. Prosser, Torts § 95, at 651
(3d ed. 1964); S. Williston, Sales § 197 (rev. ed. 1948).
4. Shippen v. Bowen, 122 US. 575 (1887); Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630, 636
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
action is the sole remedy in the absence of evidence of actual fraudulent
intent. 5
II. NATURE OF WARRANTY
The traditional distinction between tort and contract is that tort is based
upon duties imposed by law in furtherance of social policy.6 Breach of these
duties results in liability for proximately resulting injuries. 7 Contract, on the
other hand, involves obligations agreed to by consenting parties,8 and liability
is restricted to injuries within the contemplation of those parties at the time of
contracting.9 Contractual limitations surrounding warranty actions would appear
to identify warranty as essentially contractual. Under the common law a
privity requirement, which has not been completely eliminated by the Code,10
was imposed upon warranty actions." In addition, the Code contains provisions
expressly permitting the manufacturer to limit warranty remedies and damages,
and to exclude warranties entirely.12 These limitations are essentially con-
tractual in that they operate, in their purest sense, to make warranty liability
dependent upon contractual relationship rather than legal duty. Yet these
contractual elements are counterbalanced by factors pointing to warranty as a
tort. The liability for breach of warranty is tortious in character because it ex-
tends to personal and property injuries proximately caused by the breach,
(1887); Schuchardt v. Aliens, 68 (1 Wall.) U.S. 359, 368 (1863); Wells v. Oldsmobile Co.,
147 Ore. 687, 691, 35 P.2d 232, 233 (1934).
5. Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197, 200, 6 Am. Dec. 109, 110 (1813); Mahurin v.
Harding, 28 N.H. 128, 134-37, 59 Am. Dec. 401, 406-07 (1853); Price v. Lewis, 17 Pa. 51,
52, 55 Am. Dec. 536 (1851).
6. W. Prosser, Torts § 93, at 634 (3d ed. 1964); 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 4, at 645
(1941). See Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939).
7. Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948). See McCahill v. New
York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911); Lang v. Stadium Purchasing Corp.,
216 App. Div. 558, 215 N.Y.S. 502 (1st Dep't 1926); 5 S. Williston, Contracts § 1344, at
3774 (rev. ed. 1937). The liability is only for those proximately resulting injuries which the
breached duties had been imposed to avoid. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y.
339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). But this limitation is not nearly so restrictive as that imposed
upon contract actions. See notes 9 & 10 infra and accompanying text.
8. W. Prosser, Torts § 93, at 634 (3d ed. 1964).
9. New York Water Serv. Corp. v. City of New York, 4 App. Div. 2d 209, 163 N.Y.S.2d
538 (1st Dep't 1957); Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, 110
N.Y.S.2d 383 (1st Dep't), aft'd, 304 N.Y. 942, 110 N.E.2d 884 (1952); New York Market
Gardeners' Ass'n v. Adams Dry Goods Co., 115 App. Div. 42, 100 N.Y.S. 596 (2d Dep't
1906), aff'd, 190 N.Y. 514, 83 N.E. 1128 (1907); 5 S. Williston, Contracts § 1344, at 3774
(rev. ed. 1937).
10. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318 (hereinafter cited as U.C.C.) exempts members
of a purchaser's family, household and guests from "technical rules as to 'privity.'" But it
does not abolish the requirement of privity and leaves any development in that direction
up to case law. See U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 2.
11. See, e.g., Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923), rev'g 200
App. Div. 864, 192 N.Y.S. 920 (1st Dep't 1922).
12. U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719.
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whether or not the full extent of those injuries was foreseeable by the parties
at the time the warranty arose. 13 Furthermore, once the law abandoned the
position of enforcing only warranties expressly intended as such by the parties4
and created a class of implied warranties, 15 the essence of contract, i.e. voluntary
agreement, had been abandoned in favor of a tort concept of obligations im-
posed by law. To speak of such obligations as true contracts is a fiction. 16
It thus appears that warranty is neither tort nor contract, but rather a
hybrid, a unique mixture of elements of both contract and tort.'- Because it is
a combination of both tort and contract, warranty may be said to possess a
certain flexibility that would be lacking if it were entirely one or the other.
This flexibility allows it to be interpreted and developed in whatever manner
is best suited to the furtherance of prevailing social policy. If, for example,
that policy is directed toward the protection of the manufacturer, emphasis
will be placed upon the contract aspects of warranty and it will be employed
in such a manner as to restrict liability for defective products.' 8 If, on the
other hand, the underlying idea is the protection of the consumer, then war-
ranty will be treated and developed as a tort in order to impose relatively
extensive liability.' 9 The ultimate development in protecting the consumer
would be to treat breach of warranty as a tort imposing a strict, or absolute,
liability.20
Breach of warranty resulting in personal injury will impose liability upon
the manufacturer without the plaintiff having to establish either the technical
cause of the product's failure or that the manufacturer's negligence was the
proximate cause of such failure.2 1 This relatively light burden of proof and
the decline of the privity requirements2 2 point to the conclusion that warranty
is moving in the direction of strict liability. While strict liability may have
been approached, however, it has not yet been attained within the framework
13. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (b); U.C.C. § 2-715, Comment 5.
14. See, e.g., Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. 1603).
15. Uniform Sales Act § 15; U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
16. J. Ames, Lectures on Legal History 160 (1913) ; Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 Yale
LJ. 317, 324 (1918); Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 Harv. L. Rev.
415,420 (1911).
17. W. Prosser, Torts § 95, at 651 (3d ed. 1964) ; Note, Necessity for Privity of Contract
in Warranties by Representation, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 414 (1929). For cases allowing an action
in tort without allegation or proof of scienter, see cases cited note 4 supra, which demon-
strate a recognition of the hybrid character of warranty. Williston, Liability for Honest
Misrepresentation, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 415, 420 (1911).
18. E.g., by the imposition of a privity requirement.
19. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402a (1964).
21. Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960).
22. See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960);
Comment, U.C.C. Section 2-318: Effect on Washington Requirements of Privity in Products
Liability Suits, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 253 (1966); Note, Limitations Upon the Remedy of
"Strict Tort" Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of Goods-Has the "Citadel" Been
Devastated?, 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 300 (1965).
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of the U.C.C. The essence of a system of strict liability is that it is strict:
that is, it contains no mechanisms by which liability for defective products
may be avoided. The U.C.C., in contrast, makes express provision for the
limitation of damages for breach of warranty,23 for the limitation or exclusion
of remedies, 24 and for the exclusion of the warranties themselves.25 These
"loopholes" would, if taken by themselves, appear to indicate that the Code
is committed to a contract form of warranty with all its attendant limitations,
and they serve to raise the possibility of the concurrent development of two
entirely distinct bodies of product liability law: a limited (contract) form of
warranty within the Code and a strict liability in tort arising under common
law.26 But the Code is not entirely contract-oriented in its approach to product
liability. Its thrust in this area is profoundly affected by its incorporation of
the doctrine of unconscionability.27
III. UNCONSCIONABILITY
In essence, this doctrine stands for the proposition that courts will refuse to
enforce a contract or a provision thereof which is "unconscionable." Such a
contract has been very loosely defined as one" 'which no man in his senses, not
under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair and honest
man would accept on the other . . . . ",28 The Comments to Code sections 2-302
and 2-719(3) suggest that an unconscionable contract is one which, considered
in the light of the "circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract" 29 or "in the light of the general commercial background and the
commercial needs of the particular trade or case,"'30 operates to bring about
23. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
24. U.C.C. § 2-719(1) (a).
25. U.C.C. § 2-316.
26. See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 5, 9-10 (1965). In Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal, 2d 9, 403
P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), a California court stated that where both strict tort and
the U.C.C. rules are applicable, strict tort will displace the Code in cases involving personal
injuries or physical injuries to property. (Majority opinion).
27. U.C.C. § 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the con-
tract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause,
or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any uncon-
scionable result.
U.C.C. § 2-719. Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion
is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case
of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss
is commercial is not.
28. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 410 (1889); Note, Unconscionable Contracts
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 20 Ark. L. Rev. 165, 168 n.27 (1966). Although Hume
is a common law case decided prior to the drafting of the U.C.C., the Code is to a great
extent based upon common law principles and definitions. Accordingly, many common
law cases are incorporated into the Comments to the Code.
29. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
30. Id.
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"oppression and unfair surprise" 3' or fails to provide "a fair quantum of
remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract."32
Prior to the U.C.C. the doctrine, at least by name, was generally employed
only by courts of equity denying specific performance to agreements they
found to be objectionable.3 3 Courts of law, however, as a practical matter,
adopted its substance to achieve similar results by, among other devices, strictly
construing contract language against an offending party,34 limiting the effec-
tiveness of warranty disclaimers, 35 finding want of mutuality,30 or holding a
contract void as against public policy.37
While sections 2-302 and 2-719(3) of the Code now permit courts of law
to pass directly on the unconscionability 8 of either an entire contract or
specific provisions of it,39 neither the common law nor the Code has provided
a more specific definition of unconscionability than that indicated above. The
definition of unconscionability was left as a matter for case law development.
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 40 which served as the foundation for section
2-302,4 1 presented the classic example of an unconscionably oppressive con-
tract. Campbell's contract required carrot growers to offer their produce to it
at a fixed price. If Campbell rejected the carrots, the growers were precluded
from offering them to others without written permission from Campbell.42 The
court refused to order specific performance,4 3 commenting that the contract
represented "too hard a bargain and too one-sided an agreement to entitle the
plaintiff to relief in a court of conscience."4'
31. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1; Hawkland, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 11 How. L.J. 28, 34 (1965).
32. U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 1.
33. Note, Unconscionable Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code, 20 Ark. L. Rev.
165, 167 (1966). See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Newton v.
Wooley, 105 F. 541 (E.D. Ark. 1900).
34. See Hambrick v. Peoples Mercantile & Implement Co., 228 Ark. 1021, 311 S.W.2d
785 (1958); New Prague Flouring Mll Co. v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922).
35. See Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (Ct.
App. 1928); Sutter v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 Ill. App. 2d 318, 194 N.E.2d 674 (Ct. App.
1963); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
36. See Weil v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 138 Ark. 534, 212 S.W. 313 (1919).
37. See Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
38. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
39. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 2.
40. 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
41. 20 Ark. L. Rev. 165, 167 n.15 (1966).
42. The carrots were of a particular variety noted for retaining their color through
processing. Campbell could thus deny the growers permission to sell rejected carrots in
order to deny carrots of this variety to competitors.
43. Refused to compel the defendant farmer to sell his carrots to Campbell under the
terms of the agreement.
44. 172 F.2d at 83. Campbell is included in the Comments to U.C.C. § 2-302.
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IV. SUMMIARY OF CASES
Oppression, unfair surprise and inadequacy of remedy were all present in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc." The manufacturer of an automobile
gave a consumer purchaser a standard form contract in which all warranties,
obligations and liabilities other than that of replacing defective parts were
expressly disclaimed. The court, in holding the disclaimer void as against public
policy,4 6 considered the fact that the purchaser was virtually compelled to
accept the warranty which was standard throughout the automotive industry;
that he was in no position to ascertain the true condition of the vehicle; that
he might not have fully understood the extent to which his remedies were
limited; and that the remedy provided by contract was hopelessly inadequate
in the event the vehicle was totally destroyed or if there were personal injuries.47
The recently decided case of Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt4s involved a breach of
warranty action against a Ford dealer. The action was brought by the ad-
ministratrix of a purchaser killed in an accident allegedly caused by a defect
in the truck which the dealer had sold. The dealer impleaded the manufacturer,
Ford. The fact pattern was similar to that of Henningsen. At issue was a
warranty contained in a standard form contract prepared by Ford stating that
it was given "'expressly in lieu of any other express or implied warranty, in-
cluding any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness ...' ",4 and which
provided that Ford's obligation with regard to the vehicle was to repair or
replace defective parts.r0 All of the objectionable features of the Henningsen
warranty were present: The Ford dealer was in no position to refuse to accept
an agreement offered by the Ford Motor Company and he was in no better
position than the consumer in Henningsen to detect manufacturing defects so
hidden as to be undiscoverable by reasonable inspection. Furthermore the
repair or replacement of defective parts was obviously as inadequate a remedy
for personal injuries as it was in Henningsen. In both cases, a party in an
inferior bargaining position accepted terms that might have been rejected had
both parties been on an equal footing. The sole distinction between Henningscn
and Tritt is that in the former the unconscionable warranty 5' was given directly
45. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See Comment, Automobile Manufacturer's Liability
to the Ultimate Consumer, 7 N.Y.L.F. 59 (1961).
46. The true basis of the decision was, of course, unconscionability, but the New Jersey
courts were unable to pass directly on the issue until the Code was adopted in 1963.
47. The limitation of remedy would, under the Code, have been prima facie uncon-
scionable in the event of personal injury. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
48. 244 Ark. 883, 430 SAV.2d 778 (1968).
49. Id. at 889, 430 S.W.2d at 781.
50. Id.
51. The court in Tritt erred in stating that the unconscionability of the disclaimer
was a fact issue. Unconscionability is clearly a question of law for the court, not a question
of fact for a jury. U.C.C. § 2-302(1). The underlying reason for this is that as a question
of law it is subject to review by appellate courts, thereby permitting the development of
a body of case law in an area not specifically defined by statute. The disclaimer in Tritt
[Vol. 38
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to a consumer, while in the latter it was given to a dealer.52 Ford attempted
to exploit this distinction by asserting that section 2-719(3) of the Code, which
would normally have been invoked to exclude its warranty disclaimer as un-
conscionable, was applicable only to contracts to which a consumer was a
direct party. The court rejected this contention, stating that section 2-719(3)
was not so limited and that the issue of uconscionability had been fairly
raised.53
Because of the similarity in fact patterns, the practical effect of this case
is to bring Henningsen, which had been decided in a New Jersey court prior
to that state's adoption of the U.C.C., under the Code. Although the Tritt
court's statements dealing with the issue of unconscionability were dictum,
they were significant in that they suggest just how far a court, working within
the Code, might be prepared to go in applying the concept of unconscionability
to a manufacturer's attempt to disclaim warranties. While it did not go quite
so far, the emphasis placed by the court upon the dealer's status as "a mere
conduit between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer ' 54 who suffered
personal injury came very close to an outright policy statement that where
personal injury to some party results from a defectively manufactured prod-
uct, any attempt by a manufacturer to limit remedies or disclaim warranties
will be prima facie unconscionable, even if the party to whom the warranty
was directly given and to whom the manufacturer meant it to apply suffered
a purely economic, or commercial, loss.
contained two distinct provisions: (1) an express disclaimer of all warranties, and (2) a
statement that the remedy available was the free repair or replacement of defective parts.
What is the effect of the latter provision if the former is voided as unconscionable?
§ 2-719(1) (a) permits parties to agree to remedies in substitution for those normally arising
under Article 2. Thus, the second provision would, even standing by itself, appear to effec-
tively limit the purchaser's remedies. However, subsection (1)(b) states that resort to any
such limited remedy is strictly optional unless it is expressly stated to be the sole remedy.
See U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 2. As this had not been done in Tritt, the remedy provided
was optional rather than binding. Therefore, once the warranty disclaimer was declared
void, the normal warranty remedies would come into play regardless of the second provision.
52. Ford gave its warranty to the dealer. The dealer gave its own similarly worded
warranty to the consumer. Ford had been impleaded by the middleman. The plaintiff thus
predicated his recovery on Ford's being liable for all or part of the middleman's liability.
What if, in a similar situation, a middleman issued a valid disclaimer and could not himself
be held liable to the plaintiff? The N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1008 (1963) provides that the impleaded
party may assert as a defense any defense that the impleading party could have asserted.
It thus appears that a proper disclaimer, if providing a defense for a middleman, would
also serve as a defense to any party he impleads in New York.
53. Tritt was reversed and remanded on the ground that insufficient evidence had been
presented on the issue of whether the defects specified had actually caused the accident in
which the vehicle's purchaser had been killed.
54. 244 Ark. at 890. The language used by the court is similar to that of Prosser, supra
note 1, at 674: "The middleman is no more than a conduit, a mere mechanical device,
through whom the thing sold is to reach the ultimate user."
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V. STRICT LIABILITY AND THE U.C.C.
The manner in which the unconscionability doctrine has been developed by
common law courts makes its effect upon the Code's approach to product
liability readily appreciable. It emerges as a device, as demonstrated in Hen-
ningsen and in Tritt, by which "loopholes" in warranty liability, such as
disclaimers or limitations of remedies or damages, although satisfying other
technical requirements of the Code,5r may be ignored by courts on the
ground that they result in "oppression" or a failure to provide "a fair quantum
of remedy" and are therefore unconscionable. Thus, by making the doctrine
specifically applicable to warranty situations,"0 the drafters of the Code moved
away from a contractual concept of warranty and took a significant step in
the direction of a system of strict liability for breach of warranty.
The difficulty with this is that it is theoretical. It merely demonstrates
that the Code is not necessarily contract-oriented in its approach to product
liability; it possesses the potential for being moved in the direction of strict
liability. The realization of that potential is completely dependent upon the
courts choosing to apply unconscionability vigorously. But whether that
choice will be made, and whether it will be of any consequence if made, is
in doubt. Indeed, the role the Code itself is destined to play in the field
of product liability may well be severely limited by the case law develop-
ment of an independent system of strict liability in tort.57
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 8 a California court considered
the liability of a manufacturer for physical injuries caused by a defective
lathe. The manufacturer contended that the plaintiff's failure to give notice
of the defects within a reasonable time after acceptance barred his warranty
action. The court, in rejecting this contention, rejected also the idea that
warranty was the true basis of liability. In so doing, it stated that "[a]
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market
.. . proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. ' 0 "[T]he
liability", it stressed, "is not one governed by the law of contract warranties
but by the law of strict liability in tort." 0
This idea was reaffirmed in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co."' The court
there, citing Greenman with approval, overturned a lower court ruling denying
recovery for personal injuries. It did so on the ground that, although the
plaintiffs had alleged breach of warranty, their recovery for injuries caused
by a defective automobile would actually be based, not upon warranty, but
upon a strict liability in tort that was entirely distinct from warranty and
hence not bound by limitations affecting warranty actions. A lower court
55. E.g., those set forth in § 2-316.
56. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
57. See Shanker, note 26 supra.
58. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
59. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
60. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
61. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
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judgment denying recovery to a consumer was similarly reversed in Santor v.
A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.62 The plaintiff had originally sought recovery
on a warranty theory and failed for lack of privity. New Jersey's highest court
reversed, stating that, whatever theory of recovery the plaintiff had pleaded,
the true basis of product liability was strict tort, upon which the privity
requirement in warranty actions was not binding.
This common law theory of strict tort liability will certainly have a profound
effect upon the usefulness of the Code warranties. The exact extent of that
effect is not certain. In Seely v. White Motor Co.,03 the California Supreme
Court, addressing itself to this issue, drew a distinction between cases in-
volving physical injury to property or the person, and those where the loss
is purely commercial. Strict liability, it felt, was best suited "to govern the
distinct problem of physical injuries",0 4 while the law of warranty func-
tioned well in "controlling the commercial aspects of [sales] transactions."0 5
With this distinction in mind, the court suggested that strict liability will
displace warranty wherever product defects result in actual physical injury
to property or the person, and that traditional warranty rules will govern
where there is merely a commercial loss. In Santor, on the other hand, the
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this distinction, stating that "although
the doctrine [of strict liability had] been applied principally in connection
with personal injuries . . . the responsibility of the maker [of a defective
product] should be no different where damage to the article sold or to other
property of the consumer is involved."00 The court then proceeded to apply
strict tort liability for defects in a rug which had merely diminished the
value of the rug itself.
Which of these approaches will prevail? The Secly rule, suggesting a
partial displacement of the Code, places emphasis on the greater respon-
sibility of the manufacturer to the consumer who suffers physical injury to
his person or property than to one who merely loses the benefit of the bargain.
Santor, calling for a total displacement, predicates liability on the manu-
facturer's having placed a defective product on the market without regard
to the nature of the injury incurred. The Seely approach could predominate
because it is relatively familiar ground in that it reflects the Code, which
declares prima facie unconscionable an attempt to limit consequential damages
for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods, but not where there
is a strictly commercial loss or a loss caused by nonconsumer goods. 7 But is
it reasonable to say, as was said in Seely, that one rule of liability applies
where only the value of the defective goods is lost, while another more liberal
rule applies where other property of the plaintiff is damaged? Certainly
62. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See also Rosenau v. City of New Brunswrick, 51
N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968) ; Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
63. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
64. Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
65. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
66. 44 N.J. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
67. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
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the defective goods for which the plaintiff paid or at least obligated himself
to pay is as much his property as anything else he owns, and its loss would
seem to be, in principle, as great a wrong as the loss of any other property.
If any distinction is to be drawn, it should be drawn on the basis of injuries
to the person as opposed to injuries to property. Logic demands either (1)
an across the board application of strict tort liability in place of the Code, or
(2) the application of strict tort liability only where there has been personal
injury and reliance on Code warranty rules in all other cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever rule is ultimately followed, it is obvious that the Code must be
displaced to a significant degree by the doctrine of strict tort liability. Even
if unconscionability were applied liberally by the courts to expand protection
as far as possible, the Code would still contain too many loopholes that could
be used to frustrate the law's policy of protecting the consumer by making
the manufacturer the insurer of his product.'8 Section 2-719(3) of the Code
provides that an attempt to limit or exclude consequential damages for breach
of warranty may, in the proper circumstances, be voided as unconscionable.
However, no precise definition of unconscionability has been provided as a
guide for the courts, and section 2-316 permits a manufacturer to disclaim
warranties entirely if the proper form is observed. Thus there is an apparent
paradox: While it would indeed seem to be unconscionable to leave a pur-
chaser without adequate remedy by disclaiming all sales warranties, section
2-316 seems to permit such a disclaimer. Under the Code, it is possible for a
disclaimer, which is in fact unconscionable, to be allowed to stand solely
because a court has failed to look beyond the fact that the technical re-
quirements of section 2-316 had been fulfilled. A strict liability based upon
tort, on the other hand, could not be disclaimed. 9 In addition, the expansion
of the Code warranties through the use of the unconscionability doctrine
would not obviate the possibility of a breach of warranty action being barred
on the ground of lack of privity or failure to give notice of the breach within
a reasonable time.7 0 It is well established that such limitations would not
affect an action based upon true strict liability.71
The unconscionability doctrine provides a means by which Code warranties
can be moved toward strict liability. But case law has already created a strict
liability based upon tort that goes well beyond the Code and seems destined
68. See Gow, A Comment on the Warranty in Sale Against Latent Defects, 10 McGill
L.J. 243, 253 (1964).
69. The only possibility of anything approaching a Code disclaimer in such a system
would be the courts' acceptance of a defense based upon assumption of risk. See W. Prosser,
Torts § 78, at 539 (3d ed. 1964).
70. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a).
71. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964) (notice requirement); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (notice requirement) ; Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (privity).
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to displace it, either totally or partially, as it is better suited for the further-
ance of prevailing social policy in the field of product liability. Where the
Code is displaced, there is no incentive for the courts to expand Code war-
ranty protection. But to the extent that it is not displaced, the courts can
pursue their policy of consumer protection by using unconscionability to
bring warranty as close to strict liability as is possible within the framework
of the Code as it presently stands.
